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SUMMARY
In 2004-05, two American Citizens, Shaqir Omar and
Mohhamed Munaf were separately arrested in Iraq and placed in
the Camp Cropper Military Facility, pending adjudication. Both
prisoners filed writs of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. The primary issue that the
lower courts grappled with was whether or not the courts had
jurisdiction to hear the petitions. After various appeals, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that the federal courts did have
jurisdiction to entertain the habeas petitions but that the petitions
would fail on the merits. This paper argues that the standard set
forth by the Supreme Court for jurisdiction over habeas
jurisdiction, "actual custody" is too formalistic and ultimately
antithetical to the statutory habeas provision found in 28 U.S. C. §
2241. The paper concludes that rather than the limited "actual
custody" threshold, the Court should have used the more liberal
"constructive custody" standard recently articulated in various
war-on-terror cases.
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"There is no principle more sacred to the jurisprudence
of our country or more essential to the liberty of its
citizens than the right to be free from arbitrary and
indefinite detention at the whim of the executive."'
-JUDGE JOHN D. BATES
A. INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus is one of the most time-honored
- and currently contested - protections of the U.S. Constitution.2
As one of the only common-law remedies enshrined in the
Constitution, it has served as an essential check on the Executive
Branch, preserving the rights of federal detainees and ensuring
that the government does not detain anyone unlawfully.3 Recent
years, however, have witnessed unprecedented challenges to both
the availability of the writ and to its scope, as Congress and the
President have each attempted to limit judicial review of entire
classes of federal detainees.4 With little precedent to guide them,
the federal courts have been beset by difficult and challenging
questions concerning the nature of the constitutional protection,
especially in the context of the "war on terrorism." Indeed, for the
first time since the aftermath of World War II, the courts have had
to consider whether there are substantive limits on their ability to
entertain habeas petitions from individuals held outside the
territorial United States.
Although the overwhelming majority of both judicial and
scholarly attention to date has focused on the scope of habeas
corpus for non-citizens held outside the territorial United States -
1 Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 38-39 (D.D.C. 2004).
2See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.").
3 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289. 301 (2001) (holding that without express
Congressional intent, INS may not limit the right of a person facing deportation from
bringing a habeas corpus action in federal court).
4 See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat.
2600, 2635-36 (2006).
2008
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
including at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba5- the Supreme Court in 2008
also considered two cases involving the detention of U.S. citizens
in Iraq. As this paper argues, these two cases - Munaf v. Geren and
Geren v. Omar6 - are at least as significant as the Guantfinamo
cases, if not more so, for the cases implicate fundamental
questions about access to the writ for U.S. citizens that would
apply irrespective of where the individuals are held.
Both Munaf and Omar are U.S. citizens who have been
detained in Iraq by the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), a
military force spearheaded by the United States. Both filed habeas
petitions contesting their detention, but by the time Munaf's
petition was resolved by the D.C. District Court, he had been
transferred to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCC-I), and,
after a fifteen-minute trial, was convicted of abetting a kidnapping
and sentenced to death. His conviction was later vacated and
remanded to the CCC-I for a new trial.7 Omar, in contrast,
remained in detention for two years, with no formal charges ever
being filed. Both petitioners' families filed next of kin habeas
petitions in the District Court of Washington, DC.
Both the D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit were
divided with respect to whether they could ever entertain the two
petitions.8 The government argued that jurisdiction over both
petitions was precluded by the Supreme Court's terse per curiam
opinion in Hirota v. McCarthur, a case arising out of the Tokyo
international war crimes tribunal.9  With little guidance or
precedent with which to work, the courts reached different
jurisdictional conclusions in the two cases that relied on a series of
' See Boumedine v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that aliens detained as enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to file habeas corpus petitions to challenge
the legality of their detention).
6 128 S.Ct. 2207 (2008).
7 See Josh White & Robert Barnes, Iraq Detention Case Heads to High Court, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 2008, at A5.
8Compare Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2007), aff'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008) with Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v.
Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2006). affd. 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007). rev'd
in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
9 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).
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factors, including citizenship, the existence of a foreign conviction,
and the nature of custody. Thus, analyzing almost identical
circumstances, the district and circuit courts in Munaf concluded
that there was no federal jurisdiction over his habeas petition,
whereas the district and circuit courts in Omar concluded such
jurisdiction to exist.
The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases on appeal,
attempting to answer two fundamental questions: (1) whether the
U.S. Federal Courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims of
prisoners in situations like Omar and Munaf's and (2) whether or
not the habeas petitioners could prevail on the merits of their
claims.10 As to the jurisdictional analysis, Chief Justice Roberts
dispersed quickly of the government's reliance upon Hirota,
noting, "[t]hat slip of a case cannot bear the weight the
Government would place on it.""1 Relying on the plain text of the
federal habeas statute, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that
"actual custody by the United States suffices for jurisdiction, even
if that custody could be viewed as 'under... color of' another
authority, such as the MNF-I."12
This paper argues that the Supreme Court was correct in
eliminating the "totality" or piecemeal approach to the existence
vel non of federal jurisdiction applied in the lower courts; however
Chief Justice Roberts conclusion that "actual custody" is necessary
to trigger federal jurisdiction in habeas petitions is improper with
respect to such an important constitutional protection. In order to
protect the writ of habeas corpus, the federal courts should
understand their jurisdiction as being dependent upon one factor:
whether the federal courts have authority over the detainee's
effective custodian.' 3
To make this argument, this paper begins by
demonstrating that the various tests applied by the lower courts in
'0 See Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2214.
''Id. at 2217.
12 id.
'3See Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 45 (D.D.C. 2004) (concluding that the
habeas statute must be read broadly, so that jurisdiction is triggered in federal courts
when the United States is the constructive custodian of the petitioner).
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Omar and Munaf in determining jurisdiction over the prisoners'
habeas petitions have been inappropriate. In effect, this section
will argue that the Court was right to streamline the jurisdictional
analysis. However, the significant defect that still remains in the
Court's analysis is that it is focused on actual instead of
constructive custody. In order to remedy this defect, this paper
argues that an approach that focuses on one criterion -effective
custody by the U.S. government at the time of filing-should be
the dispositive factor. Second, this paper demonstrates why using
such a rule-based approach for issues such as habeas jurisdiction
is imperative in today's legal and political environment. Finally,
this paper argues that a broad interpretation of the concept of
"custody" is essential to the successful administration of such a
rule. So construed, this paper argues that Omar and Munaf are
representations of why such a clear rule for habeas jurisdiction is
needed now more than ever, and ultimately concludes that in
order to maintain the spirit of habeas jurisprudence, federal courts
should construe jurisdiction widely using the "effective
custodian" standard as their guidelines.
B. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
Shawqi Omar and Mohammed Munaf are U.S. citizens
who separately traveled to Iraq and allegedly became involved in
various insurgency-related activities against the Iraqi government
and the coalition of foreign military forces comprising the
Multinational Force-Iraq ("MNF-I"). Each were detained and
held for various periods of time. The importance of their
individual stories is tantamount to understanding the need for
effective judicial review of such cases, where potentially innocent
individuals are detained indefinitely by the United States
Government.
Habeas petitioner Mohammed Munaf is an Iraqi who
emigrated to the United States with his wife, a native Romanian,
in 1990.14 In 2000, Munaf was naturalized as an American citizen,
14See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (U.S. 2008)
(No. 06-1666).
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and in 2001, Munaf and his family moved back to Romania. 15 In
2005, Munaf led a group of Romanian journalists to Baghdad,
where they were kidnapped by an Iraqi group identifying
themselves as "Muadh Ibn Jabal Bridage."16 The group released
the prisoners late in May of 2005, fifty-five days after their
captivity, at which point they were taken to the Romanian
embassy in Baghdad.17
After their release, U.S. military officials took custody of
Munaf and transported him to Camp Cropper, a U.S. prison base
near Baghdad.18 On August 18, 2006, after fifteen months in
custody without being charged, Munaf petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.19 Three weeks after the writ was filed, Munaf was
informed that his trial by an Iraqi court would begin, and if
convicted, that he would be transferred to exclusive Iraqi
custody 2 0 As Munaf is a Sunni Muslim, he claimed he will face
significant torture if transferred, and thus, also filed a Temporary
Restraining Order ("TRO") to prevent his transfer pending
adjudication of his habeas petition.21
The subsequent series of events is contested by each party.
According to the government's brief, Munaf admitted on camera,
in writing, and at the Iraqi investigative court that he participated
in the kidnapping of the journalists for a profit.22 The government
contends that Munaf was represented by counsel of his choice,
and that he had the opportunity to present evidence and
witnesses in the investigative court.23 The investigative court
"s See id.
16 See id.
1 See id.
18 See id. The "true nature" of camp cropper is one of debate. Discussed in infra Section
IV.
19 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (U.S. 2008)
(No. 06-1666) (U.S. 6/13/2007).
20 See id. at 5.
21 See id. (citations omitted).
22 Brief for the Federal Parties at 9, Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (U.S. 2008) (No. 06-
1666).
23 See id.
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determined that there was sufficient evidence to proceed, and
referred the case to Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) for
further proceedings. 24 In that hearing, Munaf repudiated the
confessions, alleging that the confession had been forced. 25 The
CCCI, "after considering the evidence gathered by the
investigative court, taking the additional statements from the
defendants, and hearing argument from the Iraqi prosecutor and
multiple defense attorneys," found Munaf guilty and sentenced
him to death.26
Munaf's version of the facts varies fairly significantly from
the government's account. While the government contends that
Munaf's confession was legitimate, he contends that it was
coerced and that "unspecified officials told him that if he did not
confess, he, his sister, and his wife would be sexually assaulted." 27
Moreover, Munaf claims that the requisite formal complaint from
the Romanian government necessary for prosecution in front of an
Iraqi tribunal was not only missing, but, in fact, was never
authorized. 28 Since his conviction in the CCCI, Munaf has filed an
appeal with the Iraqi Court of Cassation, and the government has
confirmed that Munaf will remain at Camp Cropper while this
appeal is pending.29 Munaf's appeal was successful in February of
2008, with the Iraqi appeals court remanding Munaf's case for a
new trial.3 0
Shawqi Omar, age 49, first came to the United States as a
seventeen-year-old student. In 1983, he married Sandra Kay Sulzle
("Ms. Omar"), in Mobridge, South Dakota, and three years later
became an American citizen. The Omars eventually moved to
Minnesota, where Omar served in the Minnesota National Guard.
He and his wife have six children, all U.S. citizens. After Saddam
24 See id. at 10.25See id.
261d.
27 Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (D.D.C. 2006.
28 Brief for the Appellants at 6. Munaf v. Harvey. 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-
5324). There is now evidence that the Romanian government has officially denied that it
deputized any American official to speak on its behalf. Id.
29 See id.
30See White & Barnes, supra note 7, at A5.
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Hussein's fall, Omar, who was born in Kuwait and speaks Arabic
fluently, traveled to Iraq in the hope of securing work in the
country's reconstruction.31
On October 29, 2004, American forces arrested Omar at his
Baghdad home, claiming he had some connection to insurgent
activity. While his ten- year-old child stood by, U.S. soldiers
ransacked Omar's house and beat him.32 After his arrest, Omar
was held incommunicado for several months. On December 22,
2004, the U.S. government, responding to entreaties for
information from Omar American wife, told Ms. Omar that her
husband was imprisoned "under United States military care,
custody and control."33 To date, Omar and his counsel have not
been told why he was arrested or why he has been imprisoned for
more than fifteen months without charge or access to counsel.
C. THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Munaf filed a motion in the United States District Court
for, inter alia, a petition of habeas corpus. 34 The district court
dismissed all motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To
determine jurisdiction, the court first focused on the language of
the Federal Habeas Statute, 28 U.S.C. 2441. 35  The language of
the statute, in conjunction with the court's own jurisprudence, lead
the court to conclude that "the turnkey of the habeas statute is the
requirement of custody." 36 Under this framework, a court only has
jurisdiction to issue a habeas writ if the petitioner is in the "custody
under or by color of the authority of the United States" or "in
" See Brief for the Habeas Petitioners at 3, Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (U.S. 2008).
32 See id. at 22.
33 Reply Brief in Support of Petitioners' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 3,
Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 05-2374). 2006 WL
4048728.
14 Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v. Harvey. 456 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2006). aff d, 482
F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
35 Id. at 121.
36 Id. (citing Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 45 (D.D.C. 2004).
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violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 3
7
The court noted that the Supreme Court had "very
liberally" construed the definition of the "custody" requirement.
38
A minimum threshold, however, was that the petitioner was held in
"constructive custody" by the United State government.39 The
court then stated that if the requirement for habeas is constructive
custody, then the converse must also be true: "if the petitioner is in
custody under some authority other than the United States, there is
no habeas jurisdiction." 40 Under these guidelines, the court found
that Munaf failed to meet the threshold requirement, because he
was not being held either by the United States or in violation of the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. In reaching this
conclusion, the court found that the MNF-I - described by the
government as a collation of troops who derive their ultimate
power form the United Nations and not the United States - was
Munaf s true custodian.
Furthermore, at the time the petition was finally heard
before the district court, Munaf had been tried and convicted by the
CCCI. The court believed that this meant his current custodian
was the Republic of Iraq and that, once he was transferred, Iraq
seized jurisdiction over the criminal case against him. Because
"the writ of habeas corpus will not reach a foreign sovereign" the
U.S. Courts lose jurisdiction once a foreign sovereign has
constructive custody, the precise situation in the case at bar,
according to the court. 41 The court did state that habeas may be
invoked in exceptional circumstances, such as if the United States
is acting as an intermediary in another country; however, Munaf
failed to establish the existence of such circumstances here.
37 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
31 Id. (citing Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488. 492 (1989)).
39 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1954)).
40 id.
41 Mohammed ex rel. Munafv. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122 (D.D.C. 2006), aff d,
482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
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The District Court analogized the MNF-I and the CCCI to
the military tribunals of the Hirota case.42 There, the Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions of Japanese citizens tried by a
military tribunal where American military personnel contributed to
the tribunal and the prisoners were in the physical custody of U.S.
troops. The Supreme Court denied the prisoner's habeas petitions
because the tribunal was not a tribunal of the United States. In their
eyes, both were not run under the independent authority of the
United States government and, thus, no habeas jurisdiction
existed.43
Even though it relied on Hirota, a case over a half-century
old, the district court explained that modem habeas jurisprudence
is in line with its decision in Munaf44 Listing the cases, it noted
that new jurisprudence has taken an expansive view of habeas
jurisdiction; yet the one constant in all the cases has been
constructive custody. To this point, the court stated that this does
not mean that the government could merely "cloak itself in the
guise of a multinational force." 45 With no extensive discovery or
briefing on whether or not the MNFI-I really is the United States
42 Id. at 123.
4, In accepting the Hirota argument, the district court rejected two of Munaf s arguments.
First, The court dismissed Munafs analogy to United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles. In
Quarles, the Court found habeas jurisdiction to exist with a former U.S. airman who was
arrested by military officials and taken to Korea and charged by a court martial. The key
differentiation in the eyes of the district court between Quarles and Munaf was that
Quarles was tried by a court martial that was an entirely American tribunal, established
under the authority of an act of Congress. Here, the court opined. Munaf was never tried
or held by a purely American entity. and thus Quarles did not control. Second, the court
rejected Munaf s argument that Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) should also
control. In Eistentrager the Supreme Court distinguished between the rights of aliens and
citizens to bring habeas claims in U.S. courts. The district court once again distinguished
Munaf's claim by stating that first, language relating to citizenship in Eisentrager was
mere dicta, and, second, that the Eisentrager Court found that the petitioners were in the
custody of the United States. Thus, it concluded, it was custody and not citizenship that
controlled jurisdiction. See id. at 125-26.
44 In explaining that "recent developments in the law of habeas corpus serve to confirm
the holding in the instant case." the court cited a laundry list of recent decisions including
Padilla and Rasul. See id. at 126.
45 Mohammed ex rel. Munafv. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 126 (D.D.C. 2006), aff d,
482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
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government "cloaked," the court concluded that due to Munaf s
conviction, there was no jurisdiction over Munaf s custodian and
thus, no jurisdiction over his habeas petition.
Omar faired slightly better in his petition. In December of
2005, Omar sought a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a temporary
restraining order in the D.C. District Court (D.D.C.) enjoining his
transfer to Iraqi custody.46 The court concluded that it (1) had the
power to issue a temporary restraining order and (2) that, pending
appeals, it also had jurisdiction over Omar's habeas petition. In
reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the fact that unlike
the petitioner in Munaf Omar had yet to be convicted by a foreign
tribunal, and thus the district court maintained jurisdiction to hear
his claim.
In analyzing his claims, the court first focused on the legal
grounds for issuing injunctive relief: (1) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, (2) whether Omar would suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that an injunction would
not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the
public interest would be furthered by the injunction.47 The Court
noted two important thresholds: first, whether or not the claimant
has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and second,
whether there is evidence of irreparable injury. 48 Absent these
crucial factors, injunctive relief should not be granted.49
Under this legal standard, the court granted Omar the
injunctive relief sought. In deciding whether or not the claimant
had a likelihood of succeeding on his habeas petition, the court
looked to the different factual claims of each party.50 The court,
agreeing with the thesis of this paper, reasoned that "[a] court's
46See Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d I (D.C. Cir.
2007), aff'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
47 See id.
48 See id.49See id. at 23. Moreover, the Court noted that injunctive relief is an "extraordinary form
of judicial relief,... [that] courts should grant such relief sparingly." Id. at 22-23 (citations
omitted).
50 The government argued that the MNF-I was a multinational coalition, and thus, the
U.S. government had no constructive custody over Omar. Omar argued that the MNF-I
was the equivalent of U.S. custody. See id. at 24.
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jurisdiction over a habeas petition rests on its jurisdiction over the
petitioner's custodian." 51 Since the identity of the custodian was
still under dispute, the court granted the injunction without
reaching the question of whether or not the United States
government was indeed the custodian. The court concluded that
the question raised by this factual dispute was "so serious,
substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make [it] fair ground for
litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation.
'
"
52
Although the court agreed that the basic controlling
jurisdictional factor was whether or not the court had jurisdiction
over the custodian, the court distinguished Hirota on other factors
aside from just the nature of the custodian. In rejecting the
government's argument that the case was controlled by Hirota, the
court noted that the petitioners in that case were Japanese citizens,
whereas here, the habeas petitioner was an American citizen. It
also noted that Hirota was decided before modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence that has greatly expanded the definition of habeas.
The court stated "[in] the time between the Hirota decision and the
Supreme Court's most recent habeas decisions, the Supreme Court
has expanded and clarified the application of the 'Great Writ' to
better fulfill its ultimate purpose of allowing an individual to
present 'a simple challenge to physical custody imposed by the
Executive."' 53 Thus, it focused on two factors aside from custody:
that the petitioner here was an American citizen and that Hirota is
probably not controlling in light of recent jurisprudence. Thus, the
court decided that its primary goal was to focus on whether Omar
had alleged any facts that may grant jurisdiction. 54 Although the
court sufficiently distinguished Hirota, it left to another day the
determination of what exactly should constitute the key to
jurisdiction for habeas petitions. It did however state that if the
51 Id. at 24 (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004): Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 478-479 (2004)).
52 Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted).
53 Id. at 25 (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441).
54 Id. at 26.
2008
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
United States government is in fact Omar's custodian, that the
federal courts should have jurisdiction.
D. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Munaf appealed his District Court decision, asking the D.C.
Circuit Court to find the lower court to have erred in dismissing his
action for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals, "constrained
by precedent," affirmed the lower court's finding that it does not
have the power to hear Munaf s claim.55 The precedents that Judge
Sentelle referred to as "binding," Hirota and Flick, were cases
where, because neither tribunal in question was a United States
court, the Court held that the prisoners' habeas petitions had to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
distinguished Hirota and Flick from its recent decision in Omar,
stating that because Omar had yet to be charged or convicted in a
non-U.S. court, these precedents did not apply. 56 Munaf, however,
had already been tried by the CCCI, an Iraqi court that the majority
held was decidedly not a tribunal of the United States.57  The
Court's primary concern in Hirota was that the petitioners' claims
"represented a collateral attack on the final judgment of an
international tribunal." In light of these precedents, the court
concluded that simply because Munaf was an American citizen
does not displace the fact that Munaf has already been convicted
by a foreign tribunal5 8
The court further ignored the fact that Munaf s plea was not
challenging his foreign conviction, but the lawfulness of his
55Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).55Hirota v. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).
The concurrence (Randolph, J.) agreed with the outcome of dismissal, but on meritorious
rather than jurisdictional grounds. See Munafv. Geren, 482 F.3d at 585.
56 See id. at 584.57The circuit court disagreed with Munaf s contention that Hirota and Flick were not
controlling on his case because he is a U.S. citizen. The court found no indication that
either Hirota or Flick suggested a distinction between citizens and non-citizens in terms
of habeas jurisdiction. Id.
58 See Munafv. Geren, 482 F.3d 582, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207
(2008)..
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original detention by the MNF-I. The court once again found that
Hirota and Flick could not be distinguished on such grounds
because the forces there were similar to those of the MNF-I. In
both cases, the petitioners were held by a multinational force, of
which the U.S. was merely a part, and not the controlling nation.
Without clear evidence that Munaf s detention was controlled
wholly by the United States, precedent barred any jurisdiction over
his habeas claim. 5
9
Although reaching the conclusion that reliance on
precedent barred jurisdiction, the circuit court made an important
statement (albeit dicta). It noted that "[i]n holding that the district
court lacks jurisdiction, we do not mean to suggest that we find the
logic of Hirota especially clear or compelling, particularly applied
to American citizens." 60 The court further explained that Hirota's
short per curiam opinion did not explain why the fact of the
criminal conviction by a non-U.S. court is dispositive on the
habeas jurisdiction issue. It concluded "we are not free to
disregard Hirota simply because we may find its logic less than
compelling." In doing so, it opened the door for the Supreme Court
61to overrule, or, at the very least, clarify Hirota.
59 See id.
60 Id. at 588.
61 Judge Randolph's concurrence was the first to suggest that there may be jurisdiction to
hear Munafs claim, but that dismissal was still proper on the merits of the case.
According to Randolph, the critical factor is that Munaf is an American citizen and that
Hirota, where the petitioners were Japanese citizens, does not control. According to
Randolph. there is a longstanding distinction between citizens and non-citizens,
beginning with Eisentrager and more recentl highlighted in Rasul. In both cases, the
court distinguished between citizens and non-citizens for the purposes of jurisdiction in
habeas petitions. However, simply because jurisdiction is warranted on the grounds of
Munafs citizenship status, dismissal was still warranted for other reasons. Randolph
opined that Munaf s case was controlled by Wilson v. Gerard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), a
case wherein a soldier, after killing a Japanese woman in Japan, sought habeas relief in
the U.S. courts. The district court denied the writ on merits, but issued a preliminary
injunction barring the soldier's transfer. Under a security treaty between the United
States and Japan, the court upheld the denial of writ but reversed on the injunction,
reasoning that "a sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its
laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender
its jurisdiction." Randolph analogized Munafs case by stating that the petitioner's
detention was a direct result of congressional statute and a U.N. treaty authorizing the
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The government petitioned the district court's decision in
Omar, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Omar's
claims, once again relying primarily on Hirota as precedent for this
proposition. 62  In agreeing with the district court that Hirota did
not control for denying jurisdiction, the circuit court stated,
"Hirota nowhere explains which 'circumstances' [for stripping
jurisdiction] were controlling. Nor does anything in the opinion
hold that federal courts lack habeas jurisdiction whenever, as the
government insists, American officials detaining a petitioner are
functioning as part of a multinational force. Indeed, the opinion
articulates no general legal principle at all."63
Although Hirota lacked a clear delineation of what could
strip jurisdiction, the court found that one factor was most
controlling. 64 In Flick, a case that relied on Hirota in order to strip
jurisdiction, the Court considered a habeas petition filed by a
German national held in Germany by American troops, pursuant to
his conviction by the "Military Tribunal IV." Concluding that the
military tribunal in question was in fact not a court of the United
States, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In
analyzing Flick, the Court concluded that the critical factor to take
away from Hirota was conviction by a foreign tribunal. Thus,
even if Hirota and subsequent cases delineated some criteria for
jurisdiction stripping, the most critical factor - conviction by a
foreign tribunal - was absent in the case at bar.
The court then addressed the political question issue raised
by the Government - that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the preliminary injunction because the case "raise[s]
quintessential political questions beyond the authority or
competence of the judiciary to answer." 65 The circuit court relied
on Hamdi in rejecting the proposition that Omar's case is non-
jusiticiable. In Hamdi, the Government argued separation of
MNF-I, and thus, the same result as Gerard is warranted. See Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d
at 585-86.62Omar v. Harvey. 479 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
6, Id. at 7.
64 id.
65 Id. at 9.
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powers and national security concerns in attempting to strip
jurisdiction from the courts. The Hamdi plurality rejected this
notion, stating that "it does not infringe on the core role of the
military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and
constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims
like those presented here." 66 Using Hamdi, the circuit court
determined that Omar's case presented no political question that
could strip jurisdiction. It further explained that it is within the
courts' sound discretion to determine whether or not the Executive
possesses the authority to transfer prisoners - Omar's second
claim. 6
7
Once it established jurisdiction, the court then turned to the
propriety of the injunction. The government's primary argument
against the injunction was that "[Omar's] transfer to Iraqi
authorities constitutes release from American/MNF-I custody-'all
of the relief to which [Omar] is entitled through a writ of habeas
corpus."' 68 The court rejected this argument by pointing out the
significant difference between transfer and "releasing him to walk
free from his current detention." Transfer to a foreign country
seeking extradition is not the same as releasing him, the court
concluded, mainly because if transferred, he remains in custody
and if released, he may or may not. 69 Thus, the circuit court agreed
with the district court that it not only had the power to hear the
claim, but also that it had the power to grant Omar relief.
66 id.
67 See Omar, 479 F.3d at 9..
68 Id. at 12.
69 Id. (The court further explained that even if the Iraqi government could pick up Omar,
this sort of speculation was not sufficiently concrete to deny habeas jurisdiction. The
majority vigorously disagreed with Judge Brown's dissent on this point, stating that
simply because the Iraqis could pick up Omar immediately after his release did not make
this option the constructive equivalent to transfer).
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E. SORTING THROUGH CUSTODY, CITIZENSHIP
AND CONVICTION: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT
GOT RIGHT AND WHAT IT GOT WRONG
All four courts in Omar and Munaf used different factors in
determining whether or not jurisdiction was proper. In answering
the issue of whether or not jurisdiction existed for the federal
courts, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that both Omar and Munaf
could, at the very least, have their claims heard by the lower court,
even though their challenges ultimately failed on the merits. In
finding that the MNF-I was the petitioners' actual custodian, he
concluded that jurisdiction existed under the habeas statute. 70
Ultimately, the Court disagreed with the lower courts, ruling out
the "totality of the circumstances" approach that they had
employed. 7' In doing so, Justice Roberts created what appears to
be a bright-line rule, at least for the jurisdictional analysis, that
courts hearing habeas petitions of those in the actual custody of the
United States government have the jurisdictional authority to at
least entertain such petitions.
The next portion of this paper argues that although Justice
Roberts was correct in his conclusion that the lower courts'
"totality" approaches to jurisdiction were wrong, his approach,
actual custody, is improper as well. This paper thus focuses on the
fact that the single most controlling factor in determining
jurisdiction should be constructive custody by the United States
government, and should not be limited to, as the Court suggested,
actual custody. This paper adopts the position outlined in the Abu
Ali v. Ashcroft, which concluded that the habeas statute must be
read expansively to mean that the standard for jurisdiction is
constructive custody by the United States.
72
I. A Brief History of "Custody" Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Custody by the United States government has been the
70 Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2217 (2008).
71 Id. Although the Court relied on the fact that the United States Military was Omar and
Munaf's actual custodian, there was some discussion, in dicta, about the citizenship of the
petitioners.
72 Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, (D.D.C. 2004).
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cornerstone of the federal habeas jurisdiction since the Thirty-ninth
Congress passed its amendments to the habeas statute in 1867. 73
One hundred and fifty years later, the most current version of the
statute still holds the same meaning, stating that "the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be extended to a prisoner unless he is in custody
under or by color of the authority of the United States."74 The
statute also lists four other factors that can trigger jurisdiction,
three of which explicitly require custody by the United States
government. 75  Only one provision that strips federal court
jurisdiction to hear habeas claims can be found in the most recent
version of the statute, effective January 28, 2008. It reads that an
alien, having been deemed an enemy combatant or awaiting such a
determination, may not bring a habeas claim in a court of the
United States. 76  No other language in the statute details factors
that automatically strip jurisdiction.
Although the statute clearly states that the controlling factor
for habeas jurisdiction is the nature of the custodian, recent cases
have incorrectly presented a "totality of the circumstances"
approach to habeas jurisdiction that include such factors as
citizenship, conviction by a foreign tribunal and detention
overseas. This "totality" approach to jurisdiction emerged in WW-
II and then essentially disappeared; however it has recently
73 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 ("[T]he several courts of the
United States .... shall have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any
treaty or law of the United States .... Said writ shall be directed to the person in whose
custody the party is detained.")
74 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) (emphasis added).
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2)-(5) ("(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in
pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or
judge of the United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States; or (4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled
therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority,
privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of
any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the
law of nations or (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial." Only
the final factor, bringing the prisoner into court to testify. does not list custody explicitly
however, bringing a prisoner into a U.S. Court to testify would be considered
constructive custody under any definition").
76 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)-(2).
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reemerged in post-9/11 cases where courts have decided that their
quasi-related factual nature to WW-II cases warrants similar
readings.77 In the case heavily relied upon by the lower courts,
Hirota v. McCarthur, the Supreme Court contemplated four
factors- detention overseas, the existence of a multi-national force,
foreign citizenship and criminal conviction - in denying
jurisdiction to hear petitions of Japanese citizens detained by the
United States government. 78  The Court concluded, "Under the
foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no
power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the
judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners and for this
reason the motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas
corpus are denied."
The Hirota Court did not delineate which of these
"circumstances" controlled; as a result, courts attempting to apply
such precedent have had a difficult time formulating coherent rules
for granting or denying jurisdiction. Omar and Munaf exemplify
the issues experienced by courts attempting to decide habeas
jurisdiction. 79  The Chief Justice disposed of these arguments,
tersely concluding that the "slip of a case cannot bear the weight
the Government would place on it.,'
80
The next three sections of this paper discusses what the
Court concluded in Munaf and elaborates on what the court
correctly and incorrectly concluded in light of habeas
jurisprudence. Ultimately, the paper concludes that Chief Justice
77 See Stephen 1. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship and
Article III, 95 GEO L.J. 1497, 1504 (2007).
78 See Hirota, 338 U.S. at 197.
79 Compare Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d I (D.C.
Cir. 2007), with Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C.
2006), aff d, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007)(The district court in Munaf rejected habeas
jurisdiction on the grounds that the MNF-I was not custody, stating that "the turnkey of
habeas jurisdiction if custody." Yet, the circuit court concluded that the key to denying
Munaf's jurisdiction was his conviction by a foreign tribunal. In Omar, the court
concluded that jurisdiction was proper because there was no conviction by a foreign
tribunal and that the MNF-I as his custodian may legitimately be the United States
government, in which case there is jurisdiction based on the immediate custodian rule).
'0 Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2217.
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Roberts was correct in dismissing the multi-factor approach used
by the lower courts; it then concludes that, in light of the both the
habeas statute's plain language, interpretive case law, and the
current system of detention and conviction abroad, that
"constructive custody" by the government should have been
considered the controlling factor for the Supreme Court in
answering the question of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed in
U.S. courts.
F. WHAT THE COURT GOT RIGHT: THE INCORRECT
USE OF A CONVICTION BY A FOREIGN TRIBUNAL AS A
FACTOR IN DECIDING JURISDICTION OVER
OMAR AND MUNAF'S CLAIMS
Conviction by a foreign tribunal, or lack thereof, became
the deciding factor for both the district court in Omar and the
circuit court in Munaf. In accepting the argument that conviction
by a foreign tribunal is the key to stripping federal jurisdiction, the
district court in Omar concluded that although Hirota did not
clearly delineate that particular rule, Flick, did.81 In Flick, the
primary question was whether or not the court that had tried the
petitioner was a United States court. Since that answer was
decidedly no, the Court concluded that "no court of this country
has power or authority to review, affirm, set aside or annul the
judgment and sentence imposed on Flick., 82 Because a foreign
tribunal had already convicted Flick, his habeas petition could not
be heard in a court of the United States. Using Flick's
interpretation of Hirota, the Omar court determined the critical
factor for jurisdiction to be the detainee's convictions by an
international tribunal. Under this standard, Hirota did not control
because Omar had yet to be convicted by a foreign tribunal.
83
Without the presence of Hirota's critical factor - conviction
8! The Omar court stated that if it was left with just Hirota as a guide, that it would be
freer to interpret which factor controlled. Yet Flick made clear that the guiding principle
was conviction. Flick was a District of Columbia Circuit case and thus not binding upon
the Supreme Court.
82 Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
83 See supra note 63.
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- the court maintained jurisdiction over Omar's case. Yet the court
in Munaf using the same logic, came to the opposite conclusion.
There, the court decided that because Munaf had already been
convicted of a crime by the CCC-I, Hirota and Flick did in fact
control. Because granting jurisdiction in Munaf s case would be a
"collateral attack on an international tribunal" - a premise that both
Hirota and numerous other cases held as a basis for dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds - the court had no choice but to deny
Munaf s petition on jurisdictional grounds. 84
Both courts viewed Hirota as a precedent barring review of
cases where the petitioners have been tried by a foreign tribunal.
This incorrect conclusion was a significant departure from the rule
in Hirota and one that even the Government no longer supported. 85
The Supreme Court dismissed this approach, implicitly concluding
that the factors of pre or post conviction by a foreign tribunal were
not central to the analysis. 86 The Court correctly declined to apply
the rule promulgated by the D.C. Circuit, which would have
concluded that United States courts had jurisdiction when Munaf
filed his habeas petition, lost that jurisdiction when the CCCI
entered Munaf s conviction, and regained jurisdiction when the
Court of Cassation vacated the conviction.
Furthermore, it is a well-established principle of law that
jurisdiction attaches at the time of filing. 87 When the D.C. Circuit
concluded that jurisdiction hinged on foreign conviction, it
completely ignored the fact that at the time Munaf filed his claim
challenging his current detention by the United States government,
he had never stepped foot into an Iraqi courtroom and his counsel
was completely unaware that an Iraqi trial would take place within
the next few weeks. Had his conviction already occurred, the
84 See supra note 58.
85 In their brief in the Supreme Court, even the government argued that this fundamental
flaw encourages the government to quickly transfer and convict individuals in order to
deny U.S. courts the ability to hear their habeas claims. See Reply Brief for the Federal
Parties, Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (U.S. 2008) (Nos. 07-394 and 06-1666. 28-30).
86 Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct at 2216 ("[w]e think these concessions [actual custody by
the Government] the end of the jurisdictional inquiry.").
87 See, e.g., Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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United States courts would most likely have had their hands tied in
the manner discussed by the D.C. Circuit. However, conviction
ex post facto of filing had absolutely no bearing on jurisdiction,
because jurisdiction attached at the time of filing.
The Court, contrary to both D.C. Circuit Courts, correctly
concluded that conviction by a foreign court did not apply to a
jurisdictional analysis when the United States government acts as
the custodian of the petitioner. Holding that conviction at any stage
in the proceedings bars jurisdiction has the impact of encouraging
extradition to the legal system of other countries from U.S. custody
in order to obtain a conviction and thus deny the U.S. courts
jurisdiction over habeas petitions.8 9
Presumably, the Court recognized that there are factual
scenarios in which conviction would play a role in the dismissal of
a case, but it would be on a 12(b)(6) claim on the merits and not a
12(b)(1) claim on jurisdiction. 90 If Munaf s confinement was the
result of a conviction in an Iraqi court and the United States was
holding him for a valid diplomatic reason, such as helping
maintain the Iraqi jail system, then Munaf's claim might lack merit
and therefore warrant dismissal. 91 The Court clearly recognized
this distinction, as it concluded that, since Munaf had challenged
his unlawful detention, the only relevant analysis for determining
jurisdiction was whether or not he was actually held in the custody
of the United States government. The fact that his conviction
occurred after his filing had no bearing on the jurisdictional
element of his then-current claim. 92
88 See supra note 63.
89 See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 479 (2004) (stating that the U.S. government
cannot transfer prisoners abroad in order to avoid federal court jurisdiction).
90 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)], 12(b)(6).
91 Any dismissal that would come from international conviction by a sovereign nation
would be on the merits of the case, and not for lack of jurisdiction. If the Executive is
holding an individual in custody. the United States courts have the ability to hear the
case, regardless of the fact that other factors may warrant its dismissal on meritorious
grounds. See Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2218.
92 See Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (2008).(The Court concluded that Munafs
claim did fail on the merits; however this was not related to the jurisdictional analysis).
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G. WHAT THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS:
U.S. CITIZENSHIP (OR THE LACK THEREOF)
AS A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
Citizenship as a factor for habeas jurisdiction has been
centrally debated in numerous cases, particularly in the context of
the "war on terror." 93 Regardless of whether Congress chooses to
condition statutory jurisdiction on the citizenship of the plaintiff,
the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether or not Article III of
the United States Constitution imposes some sort of limitation on
the courts' ability to hear cases brought by non-citizen detainees.
94
The Supreme Court in Munaf, once again, skirted the issue of
whether citizenship is indeed a controlling factor regarding
jurisdiction. 95 The opinion's strong dicta indicates that United
States citizenship plays at least some role in the analysis, although
what that role is remains unclear.96 The following section analyzes
the precedents that have used citizenship as a basis for denying or
granting relief, and concludes that the Supreme Court failed in
Munaf by concluding that jurisdictional analysis should be void of
any consideration of the petitioner's citizenship.
The basis for using non-citizenship as a basis for denying
relief stems in part from Hirota.97 Building off this precedent,
courts considering recent detainee cases have used citizenship as a
strong factor in either granting or denying jurisdiction." In Abu Ali
v. Ashcroft, a case involving a habeas petition filed by an
American citizen who had been extradited to Saudi Arabia, the
government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction under Hirota
because Ali had been in the custody of a foreign nation. 99 The
court rejected this argument in part due to Ali's citizenship status,
stating "a citizen cannot be so easily separated from his
93 See e.g., Bounedine v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2299 (2008).
94 See Vladeck, supra note 76, at 1503.
95 See Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2218 (stating that the Court has indicated that habeas
jurisdiction can depend on citizenship, but declined to set out a bright-line rule on
whether jurisdiction depends on citizenship status).
96 See id.
97 See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949).
98 Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2004)
99 See id.
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constitutional rights."'100  Other courts have also relied on
citizenship to control habeas jurisdiction. 101
In Munaf, the Court stated, albeit in dicta, that Hirota was
distinguishable on the grounds that, inter alia, the citizenship of the
petitioners there differed from that of Omar and Munaf.10 2  The
key issue with the Court's analysis is its wording: "These cases
concern American citizens while Hirota did not, and the Court has
indicated that habeas jurisdiction can depend on citizenship." 10 3
The Court relied on two cases in which citizenship did play a role
in a totality approach to habeas jurisdiction, 10 4 a test that Court
here seems to have explicitly declined to extend. 105 Thus, the
Court once again failed to address whether or not citizenship
should play a role at all, yet it indicated that such does at least play
some role in the analysis. 106
The problem with granting jurisdiction based on one's
citizenship is that the necessary corollary - denying jurisdiction for
non-citizens - is troublesome. As a threshold matter, the founders
did not intend for jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims to be
distinguished on the basis of citizenship. In a letter to a foreign
national, Thomas Jefferson stated "[t]he Habeas Corpus secures
every man here, alien or citizen, against everything which is not
law, whatever shape it may assume."' 10 7 Thus, although in Omar
and Munaf s case their citizenship may have been a helpful
100 Id. (emphasis added). The court later went on the say that "[t]he differences between
the rights of citizens and the rights of aliens are considerable in this context." Id. at 55.
'0' See, e.g., Burns v. Willson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (plurality); see also United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (Courts had jurisdiction to hear claims of U.S.
citizens detained by the military).
102 See Munafv. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218 (2008).
103 Id. (emphasis added).
104 The Court relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 781 (1950) and Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 486, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004), two cases that used a
totality approach, balancing a group of factors, in deciding jurisdiction.
1os See Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2216 (concluding that the concession by the United States
government concerning custody ends the jurisdictional analysis).
106 Id. at 2218.
1
07Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, available at:
http://books.google.com/books?id=4dnSC1TokeOC&printsec=titlepage&dq=thomas+jeffe
rson+to+ah+rowan+ 1798#PPPI3,M] Book pg. 61
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component, relying on citizenship as a turnkey of jurisdiction
appears potentially unconstitutional.
At least one scholar has also suggested the same conclusion
- that jurisdiction over habeas petitions cannot hinge on
citizenship. 1° 8 He states: "[w]here any habeas petitioner alleges
sufficient facts to establish that he is in the 'custody' of the United
States, at least within the meaning of evolving habeas
jurisprudence, there is nothing in Article III that should otherwise
be read to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.', 10 9 His
argument is based on an analogy that he draws between structural
rights and subject matter jurisdiction. He suggests that those
"structural interests enmeshed in Article III" e.g., federal subject
matter jurisdiction, should not be distinguished on case specific
facts." 0 Thus, while some individual constitutional rights may vary
in application based on personal characteristics, i.e. citizen versus
non-citizen, structural rights must apply with equal force to all.
He concludes that since jurisdiction in Article III is a structural
right, that it "admits of no internal distinctions." '''
In his view, one critical difference between individual and
structural rights rests upon one's ability to waive the former but not
the latter. For example, a defendant can waive personal jurisdiction
merely by responding to a complaint, whereas subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived under any circumstance. Indeed,
courts must resolve subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even
when the parties do not contest it. 112 The reason for this distinction
is that the individual's right to due process constrains the
government only when the individual actively invokes it; if the
defendant does not invoke his due process rights, for example, the
108 See Vladeck, supra note 76, at 1504.
109 Id. at 1503.
''Ild. at 1543.
...Id. at 1544.
112 See FED. R. Civ. P 12(h)(1); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83 (1998) (stating that the dismissal of a claim based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be raised by the court sua sponte and that courts may not extend
hypothetical jurisdiction).
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court can proceed based solely on his silence. 113  In contrast,
federal subject matter jurisdiction constrains the power of the
courts no matter who the parties are or what their claims may be.
Vladeck's analogy, then, suggests that just as the structural nature
of subject matter jurisdiction imposes a non-circumstance-based
limit on the courts, it similarly confers non-circumstance-based
power. Put more plainly, the constitutional grant of federal
question jurisdiction in Article III exists completely regardless of
who the plaintiff and the defendant are in the federal question
suit. 114
Vladeck maintains that Hirota (and other cases implicitly
questioning the constitutional limits on jurisdiction over habeas
petitions) should not be read as distinguishing between citizens and
non-citizens. As long as Article III countenances federal question
jurisdiction where the plaintiff is a citizen, it must similarly
countenance jurisdiction over the same suit brought by a non-
citizen. Vladeck thus reads Hirota as an "all or nothing
proposition." 115 The case either precludes jurisdiction over habeas
petitions brought by anyone in Hirota's position - or it precludes it
to none. The bright-line rule of "actual custody" used by the Court
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny if citizenship becomes a
key factor in such cases.
Citizenship, as a controlling factor, was also incorrectly
relied upon by Omar and Munaf in their appeals."16  The habeas
petitioners argued a string of cases recognizing jurisdiction to U.S.
citizens detained abroad. 117 The issue with this argument is that by
113 See Vladeck. supra note 76, at 1544.
114 Id. at 1544-55.1151d. ("[B]ecause constitutional federal question jurisdiction exists irrespective of the
citizenship of the parties, it would be counter-textual to conclude that Article III
foreclosed jurisdiction over federal question suits brought by non-citizens where it did
not similarly foreclose jurisdiction over such suits by citizens.")
116 This is not to suggest that the petitioners should not have included citizenship as one
of the arguments in their brief. Citizenship does have an appealing view in the eyes of
the Court and thus the plea of citizenship is one that is shrewdly made by counsel. See.
e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
117 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 30-35, Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (U.S.
2008) (No. 06-1666) (U.S. 6/13/2007).
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insinuating that U.S. citizens are somehow treated differently
under the constitution's habeas provision, ipso facto non-citizens
do not enjoy such privilege. This idea is significantly undercut by
the Court's own jurisprudence. The Court in Rasul clearly stated
that both case law and the habeas statute "draw[s] no distinction
between Americans and aliens held in federal custody."118
Justice Robert's noted that citizenship is at least a factor,
presumably going to petitioners' likelihood of success on the
merits. Justice Roberts was correct in concluding that the status of
the alien does not relate to the authority of the federal courts to
entertain the petition in the first place. 119 Such an approach would
have been dangerously formalistic and an unprecedented
subversion of the purpose of federal habeas review. Importantly,
the Court nowhere concludes that citizenship, standing alone,
should be a controlling factor for jurisdiction, which is an
important conclusion for the status of habeas jurisprudence in and
of itself.
H. WHAT THE COURT GOT WRONG: USING
CONSTRUCTIVE (As OPPOSED TO ACTUAL)
CUSTODY AS THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD
FOR HABEAS JURISDICTION
This paper does not aim to suggest that there is no
constitutional limitation on the power of the courts to entertain
federal habeas petitions. If the central relief sought in a habeas
petition is to either charge or release a detainee that is being held
unlawfully, then the central issue for the courts is deciding who the
detainees custodian is, and whether the federal courts have power
over that custodian. The identity of the detainee (citizen v. non-
citizen) or events that took place after the filing (conviction by a
foreign tribunal) should be irrelevant. By using this standard,
''8 The court further explained that "nothing in Eisentrager or in any of our other cases
categorically excludes aliens detained in military custody outside the United States from
the " 'privilege of litigation' " in U.S. courts. 321 F.3d, at 1139. The courts of the United
States have traditionally been open to nonresident aliens. Cf Disconto Gesellschaft v.
Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 578, 28 S.Ct. 337, 52 L.Ed. 625 (1908).
119 Munafv. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218 (2008).
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courts will be in line with the plain language of the federal habeas
statute, 12 the intent of the founders, 121 and the other constitutional
limits on the power of the federal courts.
122
The requirement of custody has always been the
cornerstone of habeas jurisprudence. 123 Every habeas statute, from
the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the modern habeas statute, has used
the term "in custody" to instruct courts on at least one
consideration for whether the courts have the power to reach the
merits. 124 Although the Court initially took a relatively narrow
view of the term custody, 125 a series of cases from 1963 to 1973
reshaped and expanded its definition. 126 The Court's new approach
used a standard of constructive, rather than actual physical,
custody as the deciding factor for jurisdiction in federal courts. By
using an expansive view of the custody requirement, the Supreme
Court guaranteed habeas protection to petitioners who may not be
in the physical custody, but rather in the constructive custody of
the government. 1
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120 28 U.S.C. § 1983(c)(1)(2000) ("He is in custody under or by color of the authority of
the United States.")
121 See Jefferson, supra note 105.
122 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555. 578 (1992) (holding that in
order to trigger federal jurisdiction, petitioners must have suffered injury in fact).
123See Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus. 60 NYU L. REV. 991, 998-99
(1985).
124 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3637 (3d ed. 2007).
125 See, e.g., Mcnally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 139 (1934) (stating that a prisoner who is
serving a prison sentence cannot challenge a subsequent sentence because it does not
affect his current custody).
126 See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham. 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963) (holding that the Court had
jurisdiction over a habeas petition brought by a former prisoner against his parole board
when the board had sufficiently limited his liberties to the point that it was his custodian);
See also Hensley v. Municipal Court 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (holding that the conditions
imposed on petitioner by the terms of his release did constitute custody for the sake of
determining habeas jurisdiction).
127 The district court in the case that appeared before the Supreme Court as Munafstated:
"a prisoner is in constructive custody of the United States when he is in the actual,
physical custody of some person or entity who cannot be deemed the United States, but is
being held under the authority of the United States or on its behalf." Mohammed v.
Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
rev'd in part, 128 S.Ct. 2207 (2008).
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The use of constructive custody as the cornerstone for
habeas jurisdiction has also been recognized in modern
jurisprudence concerning detainees. In Rasul, the court recognized
the notion that it is not the identity of the petitioners, but rather the
ability to adjudicate the custodian that determines jurisdiction. 128
Other cases have similarly recognized that the "turnkey of the
habeas statute is the requirement of custody."' 129  Thus, the
departure by the lower courts in the cases of Omar and Munaf from
this standard in favor of a totality of the circumstances view of
jurisdiction undermines not only the roots of habeas corpus, but
also modern day jurisprudence. 130
Chief Justice Roberts recognized the impropriety in using
such an approach. As long as at least one federal district court has
personal jurisdiction over the custodian, where the custodian is
located does not matter under the statute. 131 As previously
mentioned, the only factor barring jurisdiction under 2241 is status
as an alien enemy combatant. The statute makes no mention that
the custodian must be located within the territorial jurisdiction of a
district court.
Chief Justice Roberts somewhat narrow view of the
custodian requirement is contrary to the habeas statute. First,
courts have long agreed that habeas is one of the cornerstones of
American jurisprudence. 132 Construing a narrow interpretation of
128 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004). See also Braden v. 3 0 th Judicial Circuit
Court of Ky., 140 U.S. 484. 495 (1973).
129 Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 45 (D.D.C. 2004).
3°Although the modern jurisprudence generally concerned those detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, scholars in the field agree that the relevant factor for detainees
abroad is still the identity of the ultimate custodian. "For U.S. Citizens held abroad the
only relevant jurisdictional inquiry is whether an ultimate custodian- here the Secretary of
the Army- is within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court." See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 27, Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (U.S. 2008) (No. 06-1666).
See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 US 426. 435 (2004). In a case where multiple courts
have jurisdiction, the court has relied upon the "so called immediate custodian rule" to
require that the petition name the detainee's immediate custodian and that it be filed only
in those courts with jurisdiction over that official. Id.
132 See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (stating that there is no
higher duty than to maintain access to the writ unimpaired); see also Harris v. Nelson,
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custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction risks limiting one of the
most fundamental rights all prisoners rely upon. Second, a narrow
interpretation of custody means the government can use formalistic
conceptions of the writ to evade judicial review of detention. 133
Formalistic conceptions limit access to the courts for meaningful
review of those constructively detained by the United States
government.
"There is no principle more sacred to the jurisprudence of
our country or more essential to the liberty of its citizens than the
right to be free from arbitrary and indefinite detention at the whim
of the executive." 134 Although the preceding quotation is from the
D.C. District Court just four years ago, this premise - that the right
to question one's detention cannot be limited whenever the
executive deems it so - predates the Constitution. 135 The writ is so
fundamental to our notions of justice, that it is one of exceedingly
few common law rights enshrined in the Constitution. 1
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Since the right to petition one's own detention is so
fundamental to the idea of due process, any actions that
significantly limit it tread on very dangerous territory. The
government argued that [an] "individual who is held abroad
pursuant to international authority (and not solely United States
law) is not 'in custody under or by color of the authority of the
394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969) ("The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument
for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.").
133 See 350 F. Supp. 2d at 47. In fact, this is exactly what the government did try to do in
Abu Ali. By saying that Ali was tried formally in the custody of Saudi authorities, the
government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Ali's claim. The Court
rejected this formalistic argument for a more liberal view of custody, stating "any
attempt to read a requirement that the individual be in the actual physical
custody of the United States does not find footing in the text of the statute
itself." Id.
134 Id. at 39.
135 For an exhaustive review of the English Common Law approach to habeas
jurisdiction, see Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English
Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming May
2008). available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 1008252.
136 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § IX ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.").
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United States,"' and therefore "the writ of habeas corpus does not
extend to such a detainee."' 137 The significant issue with this
statement is that it adopts a formalistic rather than a constructive
view of custody.
However, this formalistic approach allows the government
to create a definition of custody that is so narrow that it effectively
strips detainees of rights whenever the custodian is not purely
American in composition. This not only seems inherently
incongruent with the spirit of habeas, but also creates practical
issues. If the government wants to restrict the right of detainees'
access to courts, all it has to do is create "multi-national" forces,
which in essence are not multinational at all. 
138
The court in Abu Ali recognized exactly this problem.
There, Abu Ali, a citizen of the United States, filed a habeas
corpus petition against several officials of the United States
challenging his ongoing detention in a Saudi Arabian prison,
allegedly at the behest and ongoing supervision of the United
States.139 The government argued that because Abu Ali was being
held by a foreign sovereign, the district court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition, regardless of how extensive a role United
States played in his extradition and continued confinement. 140 In
rejecting the government's argument, the court recognized that
"courts have given the writ an exceptionally broad reach" and that
"[M]odern habeas jurisprudence emphasizes the breadth and
flexibility of the Great Writ in vindicating the fundamental concern
in a democratic society of checking the powers of the state vis-a-
vis an individual in custody."
141
The court set forth a framework for determining when
jurisdiction is triggered over a prisoner's habeas petition: where
the custodian possesses either actual or "constructive" custody of
the petitioner. 142 The court laid out an extensive history of habeas
137 Brief for the Federal Parties. supra note 22, at 20.
L38 See supra Section 111.
'39See Abu Ali v. Ashcroft. 350 F.Supp.2d 28, 32 (D.D.C. 2004).
140 1d. at40.
141 Id. at 39 (citations omitted).
142 Id. at 47.
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jurisprudence leading to the conclusion that the constructive
custodian standard is the only interpretation consistent with the
Constitution, the habeas statute, and prior case law. 143 It concluded
that in order to maintain a habeas corpus action, the petitioner must
be "in custody" and that his custody must be the result of the
respondent's action from which he seeks habeas corpus relief. The
court stated in relevant part:
The Supreme Court has given the custody
requirement a liberal construction, and it is not
necessary that the petitioner be in physical control
of the respondent. It is enough that the imprisoning
sovereign is the respondent's agent; that his liberty
is restrained by the respondent's parole conditions;
or that he can point to some continuing collateral
disability which is the result of the respondent's
action. 1
44
As the Abu Ali court so poignantly stated, the goal of
habeas is not to restrict access to the courts, but to create an
expansive framework to grant a prisoner the ability to question his
detention in a court of law. Nowhere is this right more necessary
than in situations where the Executive can easily - at least under a
formalistic interpretation - create barriers to this jurisdiction. If
courts contract the fundamental basis of habeas corpus, that it is
the identity of the custodian that determines jurisdiction, then they
risk stripping all individuals of the most basic right enshrined in
our Constitution, common law, and statute.
I. WHY USING A RULE OF CONSTRUCTIVE CUSTODY
AS THE STAPLE TO JURISDICTION MATTERS
As alluded to briefly above, courts need to use custody as
143 See, e.g., LoBue v. Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081, 1082 (D.C. Cir.1996) (concluding that
an individual released on bail pending his challenge to the federal extradition statute was
"in the constructive custody of the U.S. Marshall for the Northern District of Illinois" and
therefore could bring a habeas petition challenging his confinement) see also U.S. ex rel.
Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.1954).
144 Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
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their jurisdictional basis primarily because it eliminates any
uncertainty for habeas petitioners. For example, Hirota took four
independent factors and added them together to deny
jurisdiction. 145 The courts in Omar and Munaf relied on divergent
factors and interpreted Hirota differently. 146  This struggle in
interpreting a case that left habeas jurisdiction subject to
essentially "a totality of the circumstances" test perfectly
highlights the point that courts need more guidance on which one
factor should control. 1
47
Using custody as the controlling factor not only helps
courts in determining jurisdiction, but also forces courts to take a
"functionalist" approach to jurisdiction. This approach guarantees
rights to petitioners enshrined by the habeas statute - that those
being held under the custody of the United States may bring
habeas claims. Thus, the courts role in this decision making
process is to decide exactly who is the custodian, and not whether
or not other factors apply. Using judicial resources to determine
whether or not the government is the custodian, rather than doing a
totality of the circumstances test manipulating myriad factors, is
not only proper but also guarantees efficiency and effectiveness in
executing habeas decisions.
Recent events, such as Munaf s overturned conviction by
the CCCI, further highlight that amorphous factors such as
conviction unnecessarily complicate the situation and allow courts
to manipulate factors on a case by case basis. If courts simply
focus on custody - as virtually all other case law outside of the
realm deciding detainee cases has - it will ensure that the United
States government cannot rely on fleeting factors in trying to strip
145 See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1949).
146 Compare Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d I (D.C.
Cir. 2007), aff'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008) with Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v.
Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2006). aff d. 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007). rev'd
inpart, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
147 The Munaf Court of Appeals said that Hirota generates "no legal principle at all"
mainly because it failed to explain why these factors mattered in the first place.
AMohammed, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 7.
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courts of jurisdiction. 148 By adopting a bright-line rule that custody
is in fact the "turnkey of jurisdiction," the Court will ensure that
when the United States government is indeed a detainee's
custodian, as required under the habeas statute, that his claims will
be heard, regardless of other factors.
Using a rules-based approach to difficult questions of
constitutional law is not a recent development. As a threshold
matter, it should be noted exactly what a "rule" in the eyes of the
law truly is. One scholar, Kathleen Sullivan, has proposed the
following definition for a "rule:" "A legal directive is 'rule'-like
when it binds a decision-maker to respond in a determinate way to
the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules aim to confine the
decision-maker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and
subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere."' 149 This
definition of a legal rule is contrasted with a legal standard:
"[s]tandards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all
relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the
application of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker's hand
in the next case less than does a rule - the more facts one may take
into account, the more likely that some of them will be different
the next time."'
150
The totality of the circumstances approach applied by the
lower courts in the cases of Omar and Munaf represent a standard.
Both courts applied the requisite facts of each petitioner and came
to opposite conclusions. Such a standard allows for individual
biases of each judge in each specific circumstance to override the
custody element of the habeas statute. Rules, by contrast, "reduce
the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by preventing
decisionmakers from factoring the parties' particular attractive or
unattractive qualities into the decisionmaking calculus."'
51
Such a distinction for cases involving the war on terror is
148 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229. 2279 (Souter. J. concurring).
149 Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. LAW REV. 22, 58
(1992).
150 Id. at 59.
151 Id. at 52.
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imperative to the just administration of petitions for habeas corpus.
If a judge hears a set of facts that involve highly political issues,
such as terrorism, the risk of bias becomes that much more
tenuous. Furthermore, Omar and Munaf are perfect examples of
how difficult a jurisdictional analysis becomes when myriad
factors are introduced. The rules-based approach in such a
jurisdictional question will make the administration of the writ, in
relation to jurisdiction, something that cannot be stripped away
when new facts, which do not speak to the element of jurisdiction,
are introduced.
This line of reasoning acknowledges the fact that a rules
based approach reflects the idea that the "the danger of unfairness
from official arbitrariness or bias is greater than the danger of
unfairness from the arbitrariness that flows from the grossness of
rules."' 152 In other words, this paper argues that the danger that a
standard will be misapplied because of personal bias far outweighs
the dangers that a bright-line rule will create. In sum, the only
room for misapplication of this rule in terms of determining
jurisdiction lays in the fact-finder's abilities to determine whether
or not there was constructive custody at the time of filing.
J. CONCLUSION
The future of federal jurisdiction over habeas claims is a
precarious one. The Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence has
repeatedly and historically emphasized the necessity of relatively
generous guidelines governing the scope of the writ. This
generosity has not been born out of particular fealty to the
detainees in these cases, but rather a concern that formalistic
interpretations would too easily allow the Executive Branch to
frustrate the central purposes of the "Great Writ." Indeed, the
significance of habeas corpus is as much about protecting the
power of the courts to hear the claims as it is about protecting the
claim itself.
In light of these principles, the Supreme Court's decisions
152 id.
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in Omar and Munaf may set a dangerous precedent. Justice
Roberts' concluded that "actual custody," potentially among other
factors such as citizenship, should be the guideline under which
courts should determine their jurisdiction over habeas petitions.
This paper has presented a new approach. Instead of attempting to
interpret cryptic precedent and decide which factors among many
those courts thought were important, that future detainee cases
should focus on one factor: the nature of the ultimate custodian at
the time of filing. If this custodian is the United States
government, a factual question to be determined by trial courts,
then the claim should not be denied for lack of jurisdiction. If the
courts are to present a rule that certain factors automatically strip
jurisdiction, regardless of the nature of the custodian, it will
preclude its ability to hear all such cases on merits,'53 which, in
light of recent torture allegations, is a very dangerous proposition.
Furthermore, in order for this rule to be effectively applied,
courts should adopt liberal interpretation of the term "custody."
The entire point of habeas corpus is that the writ is directed not to
the detainee, but to the jailor, in whatever form he may take. 15 4
Leaving aside any meritorious claims that this paper does not
address, the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of jurisdiction
warps prior case law and the spirit of American habeas
jurisprudence. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote seventy years ago,
"It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the
precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty
than to maintain it unimpaired."' l55 Such a sentiment has an even
greater force today for Omar, Munaf and other future detainees
whose claims are yet to be filed.
153 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)
(rejecting the doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction," and holding that federal courts must
settle questions of subject matter jurisdiction before reaching any substantive questions
presented on the merits).
114 See, e.g., Armentaro v. INS, 412 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J..
dissenting) (explaining that the historical purpose of the Writ is actually to get the jailer
to show up to court).
155 Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
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